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RECENT RECOGNITION CASES
By EDWIN D. DIcKiNsoN
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law SchooZ
The prolonged interval during which the United States declined to
recognize the government functioning in Mexico, and the still more pro-
tracted period during which recognition has been withheld from the de facto
government in Russia, have produced some unusually interesting problems
with respect to the appropriate judicial attitude toward an unrecognized
de facto foreign government. In Mexico the recognized Carraiza r~gime
was overthrown by revolution in the spring of 1920, and General Obregon
was inaugurated president on the first of December in the same year, yet
it was not until August 31, 1923, that the Obregon Government received
recognition from the United States. In Russia the recognized Provisional
Government of Kerensky fell before the onslaughts of the Bolsheviki in
December, 1917, and the Soviet Government established by the Bolsheviki
soon acquired virtually undisputed control of most of the old empire, yet
the Soviet r6gime remains unrecognized by the United States even at the
present day. During intervals thus abnormally prolonged it has become
increasingly difficult for the courts to resolve the cases which arise by apply-
ing the simple arbitrary formula that all matters of recognition are for the
political departments to decide. More and more it has become evident that
cases may arise in which the courts, without deprecating in any way the
general principle which the formula is conceived to express, may be justified
in taking account in some degree of de facto foreign governments from which
recognition has been withheld. It is proposed to consider here only the more
recent English and American cases.' The cases considered may be grouped
under three heads.
Under the first head attention will be called to an interesting group of
decisions in which the question at issue was the capacity of an unrecognized
foreign government to maintain a suit in the national courts. Lord Eldon
long ago laid it down that a foreign government must be recognized by the
British Government before it can be permitted to sue in the British courts.
2
The rule has had numerous applications in recent years. The Russian
Soviet Government, for example, has made several attempts in admiralty
1 For the earlier cases and more exhaustive discussion of the questions here considered,
see Dickinson, "Les Gouvernements ou Atats non reconnus en Droit Anglais et Amiricain,"
Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparge, 3d series, Vol. IV, pp. 145-178;
same article in English, 22 Michigan Law Review, 29-45, 118-134.
2City of Berne in Switzerland v. Bank of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347.
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proceedings to recover possession of ships belonging to the Russian state,
but always without success.3 In Russian Soviet Republic v. Cibrario an
attempt was made to compel the defendant to account for funds claimed
by the Soviet Government, not as successor to previous governments of
Russia, but in its own right. It has been forcefully argued that this pre-
sented a situation which should have been distinguished from the situation
upon which Lord Eldon founded his earlier opinion, and from the more
recent attempts to get possession of Russian public ships, and that in this
type of case at least the de facto government should be permitted to main-
tain the action.4 The decisions, however, have uniformly denied the
unrecognized government standing in court.5
If the de facto government has no standing in court, then where lies the
authority, it may be asked, to institute locally such proceedings as may be
necessary-to protect and conserve the interests of the foreign state? In a
Massachusetts case involving Mexico, decided a few months before recogni-
tion was extended to the Mexican Government, it seems to have been thought
that suits could be brought in the name of the foreign state, which con-
tinued to be recognized, although without a recognized government at the
time.6 The result thus achieved is desirable, but the means seems a rather
transparent subterfuge. The court was probably encouraged to resort to
it by the prospect of early recognition. In cases involving Russia the solu-
tion has been both simple and arbitrary. Not only has the United States
declined to recognize the Soviet Government, but it has continued to recog-
nize officials appointed by the defunct Kerensky Government as represen-
tatives of Russia and the State Department has certified freely to that
effect. In the result the only successful litigations in the United States on
behalf of Russia have been those which were authorized by representatives
of the old Provisional Government who have continued their residence in
the United States in what purports to be an official capacity.7 In one of
the more recent suits authorized by these officials a motion was granted to
substitute the "State of Russia" for the Russian Government as the party
plaintiff, on the assumption, it would seem, that the Russian State has
continued to exist and has never ceased to be recognized. 8 An examination
of the Soviet Constitution gives rise to doubts, however, as to whether it is
3 The Penza (1921), 277 Fed. 91; The Rogdai (1920), 278 Fed. 294; The Rogday (1920),
279 Fed. 130.
'Borchard, "Can an Unrecognized Government Sue?" 31 Yale Law Journal 534.
5 Russian Socialist Government v. Cibrario (1921), 191 N. Y. Supp. 543; Preobazhenski v.
Cibrario (1922), 192 N. Y. Supp. 275; Russian Socialist Republic v. Cibrario (1923), 235
N. Y. 255.
6 See this JousNAL, Vol. 17, p. 742.
7 See The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, supra; The Rogday, 279 Fed. 130, supra; Russian Gov-
ernment v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1919), 293 Fed. 133; (1923), 293 Fed, 135; (1924), 265
U. S. 573; 23 Columbia Law Review 787.
a Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 293 Fed. 135, supra.
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correct to regard the present Russian State as the same entity in contem-
plation of law as the old recognized Russian state of the days antedating the
Bolshevik revolution.9
Under the second head may be appropriately considered those cases in
which the question at issue was the liability of an unrecognized foreign
government to be sued in the local courts. Unrecognized governments
have been denied for their public instrumentalities the immunities which
would have been freely conceded to a recognized government. 10 Should
the government itself, in like manner, be denied immunity from suit? It
would seem clear that an unrecognized do facto government is not in a posi-
tion to claim the same jurisdictional immunities which international comity
and concessions to mutual convenience have established for recognized
governments; but it does not follow, as certain courts have concluded, that
an unrecognized do facto government may be sued.
In Oliver American Trading Co. v. Government of Mexico and National
Railways of Mexico, an American corporation commenced an action against
the Government of Mexico in a New York court to recover damages for acts
done in Mexico. Process was served on certain representatives of Mexico in
the UnitedStates and attachmentswere levied on suchMexican public proper-
ty as the plaintiff was able to find. The case was removed from the State
court to the United States District Court, where attorneys for Mexico sought
to have the action dismissed on the ground that the defendant was the do
facto government of an independent foreign nation and as such was immune
from suit without its consent. The question of immunity was elaborately
briefed and exhaustively argued; but, negotiations for the recognition of the
Mexican Government having been initiated in the meantime, the court
delayed its decision. Soon afterwards the United States recognized the
Mexican Government. The court regarded recognition as retroactive and
promptly dismissed the suit." In affirming this judgment the Circuit
Court of Appeals pointed out that the Claims Convention of September 8,
1923, between Mexico and the United States,12 had provided a remedy which
the courts of the United States were incompetent to give.13
The question which events thus relieved the federal courts of the em-
barrassment of deciding had already been presented to the lower New York
courts, in the famous Wulfsohn case, in such circumstances that there was
9 Russian Constitution of July 6, 1923; French text in I/Europe Nouvelle,,Sept. 8, 1923,
p. 1153.10 The Gagara, [1919] P. 95; The Annette, The Dora, [1919] P. 105; McNair, "Judicial
Recognition of States and Governments, and the Immunities of Public Ships," British
Year Book of International Law (1921-22), 57-74. See also The Gul Dlemal (1921),
296 Fed. 563.
u"(1923) 70 N. Y. Law Journal, 209. See also (1924) 264 U. S. 440.
u 43 Statutes at Large, Part 2, p. 110.
1 The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is unreported at the time of writing. The
author has been supplied with a copy of the opinion through the courtesy of counsel.
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no escaping a decision. Wulfsohn had been the owner of a quantity of furs
stored in IRussia which were confiscated by decree of the Soviet Government.
Treating the confiscation as a conversion, he proceeded against the Soviet
,Government in the New York courts. The Supreme Court sustained his
right to maintain the action, reasoning in quite a mechanical fashion that
because the Soviet Government had not been recognized it was not entitled
to the immunities accorded recognized governments. 4 This reasoning was
not exactly fallacious. Like most mechanical reasoning it made no contact
with the real question at issue. The immunities of recognized governments
were not claimed for the Soviet Government. It was contended that an
immunity of a sort, at least with respect to responsibility for the effect of
its own public acts upon property within its own territory, ought to be con-
ceded to an unrecognized de facto government. Happily this latter conten-
tion prevailed in the Court of Appeals, where the judgment rendered
below was reversed. 15 In the course of a notable opinion, Judge Andrews
pointed out in effect that the court below had blundered unwittingly
into the very kind of political business which it is the reason of the general
rule in regard to recognition to avoid. The pressing of claims against
foreign governments, recognized or unrecognized, is no part of the judicial
function.
16
Under the third head it is proposed to review some recent recognition
cases in which the principal contest has been about matters of private right.
To illustrate how matters of private right may become the paramount
concern in cases in which recognition is involved, attention may be directed
to two recent workmen's compensation decisions. One involved the work-
men's compensation act of Minnesota. The act required that suit be
brought within one year after the employer had given notice that he was
willing to compensate. On July 26, 1918, the day her husband was killed,
claimant was a resident subject of Austria-Hungary and being an enemy
alien was incapable of prosecuting the claim. The employer gave notice
on May 6, 1920. The action was commenced on June 1, 1921. Congress
declared peace with Austria-Hungary by resolution of July 2, 1921. Ordi-
narily the state of war would have suspended the running of limitations. 7
But it appeared that claimant resided in that part of Austria-Hungary
which had been incorporated in Jugoslavia and that the United States
recognized Jugoslavia on February 7, 1919. The court held that recogni-
tion terminated claimant's enemy character on the latter date and that her
claim to compensation had been barred by limitation.18 The court seems to
14 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (1922), 192 N. Y. Supp. 282;
(1922), 195 N. Y. Supp. 472.
15 (1923) 234 N. Y. 372. See also Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government (1922),
197 N. Y. Supp. 467; (1923) 237 N. Y. 150.
16 See 22 Michigan Law Review, 126; 37 Harvard Law Review, 349.
17 See Siplyak v. Davis (1923), 276 Pa. 49.
18 Kolundjija v. Hanna Ore Mining Co. (1923), 155 Minn. 176.
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have taken insufficient account of the unsettled condition in Jugoslavia on
the date of recognition and of what the act of recognition was intended to
accomplish and to have imposed upon the claimant an unwarranted hard-
ship in requiring her to resolve the paradox created by some rather ambigu-
ous political decisions. In the other case, arising under the Pennsylvania
statute and involving in a similar way the recognition of Czechoslovakia, a
better result was reached and the Minnesota decision was disapproved. 19
Of the cases arising between private litigants and involving immediately
only matters of private right, the most important are those in which the
court is required to determine the effect to be attributed to the acts, orders,
decrees, laws, etc., of an unrecognized de facto government. The outstand-
ing English case is Luther v. James Sagor & Co., an action to have certain
plywood declared the property of plaintiff and for an injunction. The
plaintiff was a Russian company which had been engaged in the manufacture
of veneer or plywood in Russia. By decree of June 20, 1918, the Soviet
Government had confiscated its mill and manufactured stock. Subsequently
the Soviet Government sent a commercial delegation to England under the
headship of Krassin and Krassin sold part of the confiscated plywood to
defendant. When the case was before the King's Bench Division the court
took the view that defendant's right to keep the plywood depended upon the
effect to be attributed to the Soviet decree and that the validity of the decree
depended upon the recognition which Great Britain had extended to the
Soviet Government. Having satisfied itself that Great Britain had not
recognized the Soviet Government, the court awarded the plywood to the
plaintiff.20 Defendant took the case to the Court of Appeal. Meanwhile
Great Britain concluded a trade agreement with Soviet Russia and the
Foreign Office announced that the Soviet Government had been recognized
as the de facto government of Russia. The Court of Appeal approved the
decision rendered below, as warranted by the evidence then presented, but
unanimously reversed the decision and nonsuited the plaintiff because of the
recognition which had been extended meanwhile and to which it felt con-
strained to give retroactive effect.
21
The foreign de facto government's decree, which would hardly have been
challenged had there been recognition, was thus ignored and a company
subject of the government which issued the decree was assisted to recover
from a purchaser the property which the decree had taken from it. The
present writer ventures to think the result unfortunate and the principle
unsound. In such circumstances the foreign decree ought not to be ignored.
It is enough for the courts to subordinate themselves in matters of recogni-
19 Garvin v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co. (1924), 278 Pa. 469.
2 0 Aksionairnoye Obschestvo Dlia Mechanicheskoyi Obrabotky Diereva A. M. Luther v.
James Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 K. B. 456.
[1921] 3 K. B. 532. In Fenton Textile Association v. Krassin (1921), 38 T. L. R.
259, it was held that Krassin was not entitled to the usual diplomatic immunities.
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tion to the decisions of the political departments. They are not required to
assist the subjects of unrecognized de facto governments, at the expense it
may be of nationals, in thwarting the operation of such de facto governments'
decrees.
The case of Luther v. Sagor & Co. was appealed no further and subsequent
English decisions have accepted its doctrine as law. The recognition of
Soviet Russia, upon which the Court of Appeal based its decision, has of
course given a different direction to the decisions and has saved the English
courts from the necessity of resolving some rather complicated and difficult
problems. The limit in time upon the retroactive effect to be attributed to
British recognition has been settled with some approach to precision.22
It has been held that the nationalization of a Russian bank by Soviet decree
terminated the bank's existence and the authority of the manager of its
London branch to bring an action in its name in the English courts.
23
Even a Russian branch bank in Paris has had its suit in the English courts
dismissed, for like reasons, although in this case the Soviet Government had
not been recognized by France 24 and the suit was for breach of a contract
made in France which would ordinarily have been governed by French
law.
25
The problem involved in Luther v. Sagor & Co. has been considered in
several interesting and important cases in the United States and further
cases are in prospect if the recognition of Russia continues to be withheld.
It is settled in New York by the Wulfsohn case that the party injured by the
decree of an unrecognized de facto government cannot proceed against the
government itself. May he obtain satisfaction, where the opportunity
offers, by proceeding against an individual or corporate defendant? The
answer will depend in some measure upon the judicial attitude toward the
acts, decrees, or laws of such a de facto government. An attitude quite as
rigid and unyielding as that which found expression in the English courts
in Luther v. Sagor & Co. has been approved in a few American decisions and
in numerous dicta." On the other hand, two cases recently decided by
the New York Court of Appeals are of exceptional interest and significance,
22 White, Child, and Beney v. Simmons (1922), 127 L. T. R. 571.
=Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1923] 2
K. B. 630.
2 The case arose before France had recognized the Soviet Government.
2 Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, [1923] 2 K. B. 682.
Both this case and the case cited in note 23 preceding were overruled in the House of
Lords upon the ground that Soviet nationalization decrees were not intended to end the
existence of the Russian banks and upon grounds of estoppel. It was not doubted that
effect should be given to Soviet decrees. (1924) 40 T. L. R. 837.
See Pelzer v. United Dredging Co. (1922), 22 Michigan Law Review 29, 30; (1922)
193 N. Y. Supp. 675, 676; (1922) 196 N. Y. Supp. 342; Bourne v. Bourne (1924), 204 N. Y.
Supp. 866, 873; Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chemical Factory v. National City
Bank of New York (1924), 206 N. Y. Supp. 476, 480.
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not so much for the precise points determined as for the revelation of a more
realistic and liberal attitude.
In Sokoloff v. National City Bank, an action was instituted in the New
York courts by a Russian subject against a New York bank to recover a sum
of money which had been deposited with defendant and which defendant
had agreed to repay in rubles at its Petrograd branch. The defense was
offered and sustained in the court below that the defendant had been unable
to repay as agreed because its Petrograd branch had been closed and the
assets confiscated by the Soviet Government.27 The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, overruled this decision on appeal, holding that
the bank as a debtor was liable, whatever might have happened meanwhile
to its Russian assets, and that impossibility of performance could not be
invoked as a defense.28  The latter decision has been recently approved by
the Court of Appeals.29 The result thus attained seems clearly correct,
for the reasons given by the court.30 The significant feature of the case is
the warning embodied in the opinion with respect to the considerations
which may determine future cases in this general category.
Delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Cardozo said:
Courts of high repute have held that confiscation by a government to
which recognition has been refused has no other effect in law than sei-
zure by bandits or by other lawless bodies. Russian Commercial &
Industrial Bank v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1923] 2 K. B.
630, 638; S. C., H. of L., 40 T. L. R. 837; Banque Internationale v.
Goukassow, [1923] 2 K. B. 682; A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] 1 K. B. 456; s. c., [1921] 3 K. B. 532. Cf. White, Child &
Beney, Ltd., v. Simmons, [1922] 127 L. T. 571. It would be hazardous,
none the less, to say that a rule so comprehensive and so drastic is
not subject to exceptions under pressure of some insistent claim of
policy or justice ...
Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no
government at all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus
to view it. In practice, however, since juridical conceptions are seldom,
if ever, carried to the limit of their logic, the equivalence is not absolute,
but is subject to self-imposed limitations of common sense and fairness,
as we learned in litigations following our Civil War. In those litiga-
tions acts or decrees of the rebellious governments, which, of course,
had not been recognized as governments de facto, were held to be
nullities when they worked injustice to citizens of the Union, or were in
conflict with its public policy. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 187,
24 L. Ed. 716. On the other hand, acts or decrees that were just in
operation and consistent with public policy were sustained not infre-
27 (1922) 199 N. Y. Supp. 355. Cf. (1922) 196 N. Y. Supp. 364, 367.
28 (1924) 204 N. Y. Supp. 69.
29 (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917.
"0Favorable comment by the present writer upon the decision of the court below (22
Michigan Law Review, 131) had reference only to the court's attitude toward the de facto
situation in Russia and was not intended to imply approval of the decision on the question
of impossibility of performance.
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quently to the same extent as if the governments were lawful. U. S. v.
Insurance Companies, 22 Wall. 99, 22 L. Ed. 816; Sprott v. U. S., 20
Wall. 459, 22 L. Ed. 371; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 733, 19 L. Ed.
227; Mauran v. Ins. Co., 6 Wall. 1, 18 L. Ed. 836; Baldy v. Hunter,
171 U. S. 388, 18 S. Ct. 890, 43 L. Ed. 208. Cf. Dickinson, Unrecog-
nized Governments, 22 Mich. L. R. 29, 42. These analogies suggest
the thought that, subject to like restrictions, effect may at times
be due to the ordinances of foreign governments which, though for-
mally unrecognized, have notoriously an existence as governments
de facto. Consequences appropriate enough when recognition is with-
held on the ground that rival factions are still contending for the mastery
may be in need of readjustment before they can be fitted to the prac-
tice, now a growing one, of withholding recognition whenever it is
thought that a government, functioning unhampered, is unworthy of a
place in the society of nations. Limitations upon the general rule may
be appropriate for the protection of one who has been the victim of
spoliation, though they would be refused to the spoliator or to others
claiming under him. We leave these questions open. At the utmost,
they suggest the possibility that a body or group which has vindicated
by the course of events its pretensions to sovereign power, but which
has forfeited by its conduct the privileges or immunities of sovereignty,
may gain for its acts and decrees a validity quasi governmental, if
violence to fundamental principles of justice or to our own public policy
might otherwise be done.
In Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., a British com-
pany had entered into contracts with a Russian company whereby the latter
reinsured the former's marine risks. Losses were sustained and the British
company attempted to recover them from its Russian reinsurer. In the
meantime the insurance business in Russia had been nationalized by
Soviet decrees and the Russian company dissolved. Great Britain had
granted recognition to the Soviet Government while the United States had
denied it. In this situation, the British company assigned to a New York
company and the New York company sued the Russian company in New
York where the latter was doing business as a foreign corporation. The
defendant admitted that it was engaged in business in New York, but urged
as defenses that its corporate life had been ended by the Russian national-
ization decree, that the same decree released it from payment of its debts,
and that Great Britain having recognized the Soviet Government, the
plaintiff was seeking to enforce a right which had already been extinguished
at the time of the assignment.
The lower courts were content to rest upon the arbitrary proposition that,
the Soviet Government being unrecognized, they might ignore Soviet na-
tionalization decrees and treat the Russian corporation as an existent entity."
In the Court of Appeals, however, no such drastic and uncompromising
attitude was assumed. It was denied that the Soviet decrees could extin-
guish the debts of defendant in England or New York, whether the Soviet
31 (1924) 203 N. Y. Supp. 232; (1924) 205 N. Y. Supp. 472.
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Government were recognized or not, and it was suggested that a corporation
with vitality sufficient to answer a complaint must have vitality sufficient
to permit it to be sued. "The shades of dead defendants," said Judge
Cardozo, "do not appear and plead." Even if the issue had been raised in
the usual way, by a suggestion that the corporation was defunct, the result
would have been the same.
The decree of the Russian Soviet government nationalizing its in-
surance companies has no effect in the United States unless, it may be,
to such extent as justice and public policy require that effect be given.
We so held in Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y., 158, 145 N. E.
917. Justice and public policy do not require that the defendant now
before us shall be pronounced immune from suit. . . The defendant
has complied with the provisions of our statutes prescribing the con-
ditions in which foreign insurance companies may do business within
our borders. Insurance Law, §§ 27, 28; Consol. Laws, c. 28. It
has put itself for many purposes in the same category as our own
domestic corporations. Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268,
274, 111 N. E. 832, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 424. Far from suspending its
activities since the promulgation of the decree which is said to have
ended its existence, it has since then written policies of insurance cover-
ing millions of dollars of risks, has collected premiums in large amounts
and by the admissions of its answer, is doing business to-day. If the
Russian Government had been recognized by the United States as a
government de jure, there might be need, even then, to consider whether
a defendant so circumstanced, continuing to exercise its corporate powers
under the license of our laws, would be heard to assert its extinction in
avoidance of asuit. Cf. Thompson on Corporations, § 6569; 2 Morawetz,
Private Corporations (2d Ed.) § 1003; 37 Harvard Law Review, 610.
In the existing situation, the refinements of learning that envelop and
to some extent obscure the definition of de facto corporations are foreign
to our inquiry. So long, at least, as the decree of the Russian govern-
ment is denied recognition as an utterance of sovereignty, the problem
before us is governed, not by any technical rules, but by the largest
considerations of public policy and justice. MacLeod v. U. S., 229 U. S.
416,428,429,33 S. Ct. 955,57 L. Ed. 1260. When regard is had to these,
the answer is not doubtful. The defendant asks us to declare its death
as a means to the nullification of its debts and the confiscation of its
assets by the government of its domicile. Neither the public policy of
the nation, as established by President and Congress, nor any consider-
ation of equity or justice, exacts an exception in such conditions to the
need of recognition. We do not say that a government unrecognized by
ours will always be viewed as non existent by our courts, though the sole
question at issue has to do with a transaction between the unrecognized
government and a citizen or subject of a government by which recog-
nition has been given. To say this might seem to imply, for illustration,
that a voluntary conveyance by a British subject to the Soviet govern-
ment would be viewed as a nullity in the United States on some theory
that the grantee, though recognized in Great Britain, was without capaci-
ty to take. No such sweeping declaration is essential to the decision of
the case before us. We deal now with the single question whether de-
fendant has an existence sufficient to subject it to suit in the domestic
272 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
forum. That is a question which the law of the forum will determine for
itself. Liability to be sued is quite distinct from liability to be held
in judgment upon the facts developed in the suit. We keep our ruling
within these limits, and hold that the defendant is amenable to the
process of our courts.
2
The New York Court of Appeals was not required, in either of the cases
noted above, to pronounce unreservedly as to the effect which may be at-
tributed to the decrees of an unrecognized de facto government. It is all
the more noteworthy that it challenged attention to the problem, making
it clear that considerations of policy and justice may warrant a court in
giving effect indirectly, at least, to such decrees, even though plausible
syllogisms or the arbitrary premises of a mechanical logic be shaken in the
process. The same tribunal that delivered final judgment in the Wulfsohn
case may yet find an opportunity to establish a precedent of equal or even
greater significance for cases of another type.
a (1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369, 370, 371. See also Russian Reinsurance Co. v.
Stoddard (1925), 207 N. Y. Supp. 574, and Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc.
(1924), 207 N. Y. Supp. 588, reported since this article was written.
